An Empirical Study on Sales Performance Effect and Pricing Strategy for E-Commerce: From the Perspective of Mobile Information

TLDR

Internet e‑commerce platforms expand consumer choice but also facilitate counterfeit and fraudulent signals that harm consumer rights and disrupt market order, yet empirical studies on their long‑term dynamic effects and seller incentives are lacking in China. This study uses platform data and capture technology to empirically analyze the dynamic performance‑effect mechanism of counterfeit‑product fraudulent signals under multiple game conditions and to propose management recommendations. The authors employ data‑capture analytics to examine how fraudulent signals influence sales dynamics and to evaluate the pricing‑based seller incentive mechanism for counterfeit products. Results indicate that fraudulent signals boost short‑term sales but ultimately lead to a long‑term decline in performance.

Abstract

The emergence of Internet product sales platform has not only greatly enriched consumers’ choices and facilitated their purchasing behavior but also provided space for counterfeit products and relevant fraudulent signal strategies in China, which damage the consumer’s rights and interests and further disrupt the normal order of the e-commerce market. However, effective empirical study on the long-term and dynamic influence mechanism of fraudulent signals of counterfeit products and the seller incentive mechanism is still unavailable in academic circles, especially in the Chinese market, where government regulation is deemed to be lacking. For the purpose of this paper, an empirical study has been conducted by virtue of Internet e-commerce platform data based on data capture technology to analyze the dynamic performance effect mechanism of e-commerce fraudulent signals of counterfeit products under multiple game conditions. The study results show that selling of counterfeit products by using fraudulent signals can improve the current sales performance, but it will cause a long-term performance decline consequently. Additionally, from the perspective of the pricing mechanism, this paper analyzes the said seller incentive mechanism of counterfeit products. Finally, this paper puts forward relevant management suggestions based on the empirical study findings.