Good Principals or Good Peers? Parental Valuation of School Characteristics, Tiebout Equilibrium, and the Incentive Effects of Competition among Jurisdictions

Jesse Rothstein

American Economic Review · 2006 · 282 citations · 59 references

Concepts

TL;DR

In a multicommunity model, high‑income families cluster near effective schools, and governmental fragmentation facilitates this residential sorting, implying that parents who prefer effective schools will see income correlate with school effectiveness in a high‑choice‑market equilibrium. The study investigates how student background and test scores vary across schools in metropolitan areas with different educational governance structures. The authors analyze student background and test scores across schools in these metropolitan areas to assess the impact of governance structure. I find little indication of the “effectiveness sorting” that is predicted if parents choose neighborhoods for the efficacy of the local schools, suggesting caution about the productivity implications of school choice policies.

Abstract

In a multicommunity model, high-income families cluster together in any equilibrium, and cluster near effective schools if effectiveness is an important component of community desirability. Governmental fragmentation facilitates this residential sorting. Thus, if parents prefer effective schools, income correlates with effectiveness in high-choice-market equilibrium. I examine the distribution of student background and test scores across schools within metropolitan areas that differ in the structure of educational governance. I find little indication of the “effectiveness sorting” that is predicted if parents choose neighborhoods for the efficacy of the local schools. This suggests caution about the productivity implications of school choice policies.

References

59