Tiebout Competition

Tiebout Competition is a theoretical model in public economics, under the broader framework of competitive federalism, that conceptualizes the process by which individuals "vote with their feet" by relocating across jurisdictions to select local public goods bundles that best match their preferences, thereby inducing efficiency in local government provision analogous to market competition.

36

Publications

3K

Citations

52

Authors

38

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

1

Variants

Tiebout HypothesisTiebout Model

Authors

52

  1. MW
    Myrna Wooders

    Vanderbilt University, United States

    3 publications · 152 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. JP
    John P. Conley

    University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, United States

    2 publications · 109 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. FD
    Feng Deng

    Chongqing Technology and Business University, China

    2 publications · 52 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. JR
    Jesse Rothstein

    University of California, Berkeley, United States

    2 publications · 321 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. RO
    RÃÂémy Oddou

    1 publications · 11 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 52

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 6 publications · 182 citations

    6

    h-index

  2. American Economic Review

    4 publications · 1.5K citations

    4

    h-index

  3. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 3 publications · 58 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. Public Finance Review

    PFR · 3 publications · 53 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. Journal of Urban Economics

    3 publications · 227 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5