Doing Business with Strangers: Reputation in Online Service Marketplaces

Antonio Moreno, Christian Terwiesch

Information Systems Research · 2014 · 195 citations · 38 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Online service marketplaces let buyers post projects and sellers bid, and they mitigate transaction risk by tracking and publishing seller performance. This study analyzes 1.8 million bids from 270 000 projects on a leading software‑development intermediary to examine how reputation systems influence market outcomes. The authors use a numerical reputation score and an unstructured reputation measure derived from text mining of buyer praise to assess reputational effects. Buyers accept higher bids from more reputable sellers, while sellers raise bids and win rates with higher reputation and face higher exit risk after negative shocks, showing that both structured and unstructured reputations strongly shape market behavior.

Abstract

Online service marketplaces allow service buyers to post their project requests and service providers to bid for them. To reduce the transactional risks, marketplaces typically track and publish previous seller performance. By analyzing a detailed transactional data set with more than 1,800,000 bids corresponding to 270,000 projects posted between 2001 and 2010 in a leading online intermediary for software development services, we empirically study the effects of the reputation system on market outcomes. We consider both a structured measure summarized in a numerical reputation score and an unstructured measure based on the verbal praise left by previous buyers, which we encode using text mining techniques. We find that buyers trade off reputation (both structured and unstructured) and price and are willing to accept higher bids posted by more reputable bidders. Sellers also respond to changes in their own reputation through three different channels. They increase their bids with their reputation score (price effect) but primarily use a superior reputation to increase their probability of being selected (volume effect) as opposed to increasing their bid prices. Negative shocks in seller reputation are associated to an increase in the probability of seller exit (exit effect), but this effect is moderated by the investment that the seller has made in the site. We conclude that participants in this market are very responsive to the numerical reputation score and also to the unstructured reputational information, which behaves in a similar way to the structured numerical reputation score but provides complementary information.

References

38