Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations

Philippe Jéhiel, Benny Moldovanu

Econometrica · 2001 · 505 citations · 19 references

Concepts

TL;DR

So we output 3 sentences in that order. Purpose/Mechanism combined: first line has both labels. The content: "We study efficient, Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms in a social choice setting that allows for informational and allocative externalities." So purpose: study efficient, Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms in social choice with externalities.

Abstract

We study efficient, Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms in a social choice setting that allows for informational and allocative externalities. We show that such mechanisms exist only if a congruence condition relating private and social rates of information substitution is satisfied. If signals are multi-dimensional, the congruence condition is determined by an integrability constraint, and it can hold only in nongeneric cases where values are private or a certain symmetry assumption holds. If signals are one-dimensional, the congruence condition reduces to a monotonicity constraint and it can be generically satisfied. We apply the results to the study of multi-object auctions, and we discuss why such auctions cannot be reduced to one-dimensional models without loss of generality.

References

19