Interdependent-value Auctions

Interdependent-Value Auctions is an auction model in which each bidder’s private value for the object being auctioned belongs to a common value framework yet depends on both their own private signal and the signals of other bidders, distinguishing it from pure private-value and pure common-value auctions by incorporating asymmetric information and strategic interdependence in valuation formation.

61

Publications

3.5K

Citations

97

Authors

73

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

9

Authors

97

  1. IT
    Inbal Talgam-Cohen

    Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, Israel

    4 publications · 93 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. DB
    Dirk Bergemann

    Yale University, United States

    4 publications · 95 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. MF
    Michal Feldman

    Tel Aviv University, Israel

    3 publications · 43 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. DC
    David C. Parkes

    Harvard University Press, United States

    3 publications · 51 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. PJ
    Philip J. Reny

    University of Chicago, United States

    3 publications · 353 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 97

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 4 publications · 56 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 4 publications · 235 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. American Economic Review

    3 publications · 793 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. Games and Economic Behavior

    3 publications · 144 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. Econometrica

    3 publications · 846 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5