Efficient Auction Design

Efficient Auction Design is a theoretical framework in auction theory that specifies the rules and mechanisms for allocating resources among bidders in a manner that maximizes social welfare by ensuring that the bidder who values the item most highly wins the auction, under given informational and strategic constraints.

150

Publications

10.5K

Citations

330

Authors

181

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

36

Authors

330

  1. ST
    Stefano Turchetta

    University of Oxford, United Kingdom

    4 publications · 107 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. GA
    Gagan Aggarwal

    Stanford University, United States

    4 publications · 206 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. RC
    Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi

    University of Oxford, United Kingdom

    4 publications · 107 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. TR
    Tim Roughgarden

    Stanford University, United States

    4 publications · 72 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. BD
    Bart de Keijzer

    Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica, Netherlands

    4 publications · 107 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5 of 330

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 8 publications · 978 citations

    8

    h-index

  2. Econometrica

    6 publications · 2.1K citations

    6

    h-index

  3. Games and Economic Behavior

    6 publications · 139 citations

    6

    h-index

  4. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 5 publications · 201 citations

    5

    h-index

  5. Management Science

    5 publications · 502 citations

    5

    h-index

1–5