Efficient Auction Design
Efficient Auction Design is a theoretical framework in auction theory that specifies the rules and mechanisms for allocating resources among bidders in a manner that maximizes social welfare by ensuring that the bidder who values the item most highly wins the auction, under given informational and strategic constraints.
150
Publications
10.5K
Citations
330
Authors
181
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
36
Parents
150
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
Sven de Vries, Rakesh Vohra · INFORMS journal on computing · 2003 · 997 citations
Business, Economics, Mathematics +16
Paul Klemperer · SSRN Electronic Journal · 2004 · 792 citations · Full text
Business, Economics, Auction Theory +14
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
Philippe Jéhiel, Benny Moldovanu · Econometrica · 2001 · 505 citations
Xia Zhou, Sorabh Gandhi, Subhash Suri et al. · 2008 · 440 citations
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181
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, United States
7 h-index
9 publications
553 citations
Microsoft (United States)
Redmond, United States
7 h-index
11 publications
403 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
7 h-index
8 publications
284 citations

Harvard University Press
Cambridge, United States
5 h-index
7 publications
449 citations
University of Oxford
Oxford, United Kingdom
5 h-index
6 publications
910 citations
Technical University of Munich
Munich, Germany
5 h-index
9 publications
1.4K citations
Google (United States)
Mountain View, United States
5 h-index
8 publications
230 citations
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, United States
5 h-index
5 publications
131 citations
1–8 of 181
Repository · 8 publications · 978 citations
8
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6 publications · 2.1K citations
6
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6 publications · 139 citations
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JET · 5 publications · 201 citations
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5 publications · 502 citations
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