Econometrica · 1982 · 3.8K citations · 19 references
BusinessEconomicsAuction TheoryDecision TheoryGame TheoryAuction DesignBidder Valuation ModelsCommon-value AuctionsDynamic AuctionsPrivate-value AuctionsAuction Algorithms
Abstract : In Section 2, we review some important results of the received auction theory, introduce a new general auction model, and summarize the results of our analysis. Section 3 contains a formal statement of our model, and develops the properties of affiliated random variables. The various theorems are presented in Sections 4-8. In Section 9, we offer our views on the current state of auction theory. Following Section 9 is a technical appendix dealing with affiliated random variables.
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