Auction Design
Auction Design is a theoretical framework within auction theory and industrial organization that specifies the rules and mechanisms governing the allocation of goods and the determination of prices in order to achieve specific economic objectives, distinguished from other market institutions by its focus on strategically structuring bidding environments to align participant incentives with desired outcomes.
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2017–2026
629
3.3K
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
William Vickrey · The Journal of Finance · 1961 · 7.3K citations
Roger B. Myerson · Mathematics of Operations Research · 1981 · 6.1K citations
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Paul Milgrom, Robert J. Weber · Econometrica · 1982 · 3.8K citations
Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders
William Vickrey · The Journal of Finance · 1961 · 1.9K citations
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Stanford University
Stanford, United States
51 h-index
161 publications
16.7K citations
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
37 h-index
86 publications
12.5K citations
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Jerusalem, Israel
35 h-index
83 publications
6.9K citations
University of Maryland, College Park
College Park, United States
35 h-index
101 publications
7.6K citations
Microsoft (United States)
Redmond, United States
34 h-index
104 publications
5.1K citations
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, United States
34 h-index
85 publications
5.1K citations
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, United States
31 h-index
68 publications
5.1K citations
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, United States
30 h-index
77 publications
7.1K citations
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109 publications · 7.6K citations
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57 publications · 5.9K citations
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JET · 81 publications · 5.8K citations
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Repository · 150 publications · 5.1K citations
35
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56 publications · 3.6K citations
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