Auction Design

Auction Design is a theoretical framework within auction theory and industrial organization that specifies the rules and mechanisms governing the allocation of goods and the determination of prices in order to achieve specific economic objectives, distinguished from other market institutions by its focus on strategically structuring bidding environments to align participant incentives with desired outcomes.

3.3K

Publications

211.8K

Citations

5K

Authors

1.6K

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

629

Authors

5K

  1. DC
    David C. Parkes

    Harvard University Press, United States

    35 publications · 2.4K citations

    26

    h-index

  2. PC
    Peter Cramton

    University of Maryland, College Park, United States

    38 publications · 4.1K citations

    24

    h-index

  3. NN
    Noam Nisan

    Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    29 publications · 2.9K citations

    23

    h-index

  4. PM
    Paul Milgrom

    Stanford University, United States

    25 publications · 7.6K citations

    22

    h-index

  5. TS
    Tüomas Sandholm

    Carnegie Mellon University, United States

    28 publications · 2.7K citations

    21

    h-index

1–5 of 5K

Venues

  1. Games and Economic Behavior

    109 publications · 7.6K citations

    48

    h-index

  2. Management Science

    57 publications · 5.9K citations

    39

    h-index

  3. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 81 publications · 5.8K citations

    37

    h-index

  4. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 150 publications · 5.1K citations

    35

    h-index

  5. Economic Theory

    56 publications · 3.6K citations

    30

    h-index

1–5