Ascending-clock Auctions

Ascending-Clock Auctions is a dynamic auction mechanism in which the auctioneer progressively increases the price over time according to a predetermined schedule, and bidders indicate their willingness to continue participating at the current price, with the auction ending when only one bidder remains active.

20

Publications

1.1K

Citations

40

Authors

18

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

3

Variants

Clock Auction

Authors

40

  1. PC
    Peter Cramton

    University of Maryland, College Park, United States

    3 publications · 223 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. PM
    Paul Milgrom

    Stanford University, United States

    2 publications · 135 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. YC
    Yan Chen

    University of Maryland, College Park, United States

    2 publications · 160 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. AB
    Allen B. MacKenzie

    Virginia Tech, United States

    2 publications · 37 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. VG
    Vasilis Gkatzelis

    New York University, United States

    2 publications · 45 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 40

Venues

  1. American Economic Journal Microeconomics

    2 publications · 135 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. AgEcon Search (University of Minnesota, USA)

    Repository · 1 publications · 55 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. Econometrica

    1 publications · 269 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. Journal of the European Economic Association

    JEEA · 1 publications · 156 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid

    1 publications · 42 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5