Ascending-clock Auctions
Ascending-Clock Auctions is a dynamic auction mechanism in which the auctioneer progressively increases the price over time according to a predetermined schedule, and bidders indicate their willingness to continue participating at the current price, with the auction ending when only one bidder remains active.
20
Publications
1.1K
Citations
40
Authors
18
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
3
Variants
Clock Auction
Parents
20
Auctioning Many Divisible Goods
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton · Journal of the European Economic Association · 2004 · 156 citations
Business, Economics, Mathematics +14
Spectrum Auction Games for Multimedia Streaming Over Cognitive Radio Networks
Yan Chen, Yongle Wu, Beibei Wang et al. · 2010 · 77 citations
Assignment Messages and Exchanges
Paul Milgrom · American Economic Journal Microeconomics · 2009 · 74 citations
1–5 of 20
40
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2
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2
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2
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1–5 of 40
18
University of Maryland, College Park
College Park, United States
5 h-index
15 publications
1.1K citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
5 h-index
9 publications
364 citations
The Ohio State University
Columbus, United States
2 h-index
3 publications
599 citations
Virginia Tech
Blacksburg, United States
2 h-index
4 publications
74 citations
London School of Economics and Political Science
London, United Kingdom
1 h-index
1 publications
20 citations

Drexel University
Philadelphia, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
20 citations
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
61 citations

Peking University
Beijing, China
1 h-index
3 publications
126 citations
1–8 of 18
2 publications · 135 citations
2
h-index
Repository · 1 publications · 55 citations
1
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1 publications · 269 citations
1
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JEEA · 1 publications · 156 citations
1
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1 publications · 42 citations
1
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1–5