Dynamic Auctions
Dynamic Auctions is an auction mechanism in which allocation and pricing are determined through a sequence of strategically interdependent bidding stages over time, allowing information, participation, or relevant state variables to evolve between rounds rather than being fixed in a single, simultaneous interaction.
1.4K
Publications
111.7K
Citations
2.4K
Authors
854
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
237
Parents
1.4K
Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading
Albert S. Kyle · Econometrica · 1985 · 10K citations
Business, Economics, Auction Theory +12
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
William Vickrey · The Journal of Finance · 1961 · 7.3K citations
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Paul Milgrom, Robert J. Weber · Econometrica · 1982 · 3.8K citations
Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders
William Vickrey · The Journal of Finance · 1961 · 1.9K citations
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11
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854
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
32 h-index
60 publications
6.1K citations
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
22 h-index
36 publications
10.2K citations
Microsoft (United States)
Redmond, United States
21 h-index
65 publications
2.8K citations
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Jerusalem, Israel
20 h-index
39 publications
3.8K citations
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, United States
19 h-index
28 publications
1.9K citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
19 h-index
34 publications
11K citations
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, United States
19 h-index
28 publications
1.8K citations
University of Arizona
Tucson, United States
18 h-index
30 publications
1.4K citations
1–8 of 854
64 publications · 4.5K citations
32
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JET · 51 publications · 3.9K citations
30
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43 publications · 1.8K citations
22
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Repository · 63 publications · 2.2K citations
22
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25 publications · 1.6K citations
21
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