Dynamic Auctions

Dynamic Auctions is an auction mechanism in which allocation and pricing are determined through a sequence of strategically interdependent bidding stages over time, allowing information, participation, or relevant state variables to evolve between rounds rather than being fixed in a single, simultaneous interaction.

1.4K

Publications

111.7K

Citations

2.4K

Authors

854

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

237

Authors

2.4K

  1. NN
    Noam Nisan

    Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    16 publications · 2.1K citations

    16

    h-index

  2. DC
    David C. Parkes

    Harvard University Press, United States

    16 publications · 1K citations

    15

    h-index

  3. NR
    Nikhil R. Devanur

    Microsoft (United States), United States

    13 publications · 285 citations

    12

    h-index

  4. DL
    Dan Levin

    The Ohio State University, United States

    12 publications · 812 citations

    12

    h-index

  5. SB
    Santiago Balseiro

    Columbia University, United States

    11 publications · 546 citations

    11

    h-index

1–5 of 2.4K

Venues

  1. Games and Economic Behavior

    64 publications · 4.5K citations

    32

    h-index

  2. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 51 publications · 3.9K citations

    30

    h-index

  3. Economics Letters

    43 publications · 1.8K citations

    22

    h-index

  4. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 63 publications · 2.2K citations

    22

    h-index

  5. Management Science

    25 publications · 1.6K citations

    21

    h-index

1–5