Common Value Dynamic Auctions

Common Value Dynamic Auctions is a dynamic auction mechanism in which bidders compete over time for an item with a shared but uncertain value, distinguished from private value auctions by the commonality of the item’s intrinsic worth and the informational interdependence among bidders.

10

Publications

594

Citations

21

Authors

17

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

0

Authors

21

  1. GD
    Georges Dionne

    HEC Montréal, Canada

    3 publications · 73 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. PS
    Pascal St‐Amour

    University of Lausanne, Switzerland

    2 publications · 51 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. AS
    Andrew Stocking

    Congressional Budget Office, United States

    2 publications · 23 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. EÖ
    Erkut Özbay

    University of Maryland, College Park, United States

    2 publications · 23 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. PC
    Peter Cramton

    University of Maryland, College Park, United States

    2 publications · 23 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 21

Venues

  1. Games and Economic Behavior

    3 publications · 130 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 2 publications · 37 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 1 publications · 12 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. European Economic Review

    1 publications · 357 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. The Review of Economic Studies

    1 publications · 36 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5