The Journal of Finance · 2015 · 106 citations · 47 references
BusinessBusiness EconomicsEconomicsAgency TheoryContract TheoryLabor EconomicsAdverse SelectionFinancial RiskMoral HazardOptimal ContractingUnemploymentWorking HoursDynamic ContractsDynamic Moral HazardEquilibriumLong Work HoursManagerial Moral HazardMoral Hazard AnalysisMoral Hazard BehaviorOptimal Contracting Theory
ABSTRACT Many finance jobs entail the risk of large losses, and hard‐to‐monitor effort. We analyze the equilibrium consequences of these features in a model with optimal dynamic contracting. We show that finance jobs feature high compensation, up‐or‐out promotion, and long work hours, and are more attractive than other jobs. Moral hazard problems are exacerbated in booms, even though pay increases. Employees whose talent would be more valuable elsewhere can be lured into finance jobs, while the most talented employees might be unable to land these jobs because they are “too hard to manage.”
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Moral Hazard and Observability
Bengt Holmström · The Bell Journal of Economics · 1979 · 8.5K citations
Alan Harrison, Chris Robinson, Orley Ashenfelter et al. · Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d économique · 1989 · 3.2K citations