Dynamic Contracts
Dynamic Contracts is a theoretical framework in financial economics that models contractual agreements as sequences of decisions adaptively revised over time in response to evolving information and incentive structures, distinguishing it from static or complete contract paradigms by its explicit incorporation of temporal flexibility and strategic renegotiation under uncertainty.
246
Publications
15.5K
Citations
429
Authors
276
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
56
Parents
246
Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption
Faruk Gül, Wolfgang Pesendorfer · Econometrica · 2003 · 487 citations · Full text
Business, Economics, Agency Theory +14
Optimal Long-Term Financial Contracting
Peter M. DeMarzo, Michael J. Fishman · Review of Financial Studies · 2007 · 466 citations
1–5 of 246
429
7
h-index
5
h-index
4
h-index
4
h-index
3
h-index
1–5 of 429
276
University of Chicago
Chicago, United States
11 h-index
13 publications
821 citations

National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
8 h-index
9 publications
793 citations
Centre for Economic Policy Research
London, United Kingdom
8 h-index
8 publications
173 citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
8 h-index
10 publications
1K citations
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
8 h-index
9 publications
1K citations
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, United States
7 h-index
11 publications
494 citations
Duke University
Durham, United States
7 h-index
10 publications
639 citations

Cornell University
Ithaca, United States
7 h-index
12 publications
547 citations
1–8 of 276
Repository · 33 publications · 851 citations
16
h-index
JET · 11 publications · 448 citations
11
h-index
Repository · 13 publications · 295 citations
11
h-index
10 publications · 1.3K citations
10
h-index
9 publications · 1.3K citations
9
h-index
1–5