Dynamic Contracts

Dynamic Contracts is a theoretical framework in financial economics that models contractual agreements as sequences of decisions adaptively revised over time in response to evolving information and incentive structures, distinguishing it from static or complete contract paradigms by its explicit incorporation of temporal flexibility and strategic renegotiation under uncertainty.

246

Publications

15.5K

Citations

429

Authors

276

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

56

Authors

429

  1. ZH
    Zhiguo He

    University of Chicago, United States

    7 publications · 549 citations

    7

    h-index

  2. PM
    Peter M. DeMarzo

    National Bureau of Economic Research, United States

    5 publications · 1.6K citations

    5

    h-index

  3. MM
    Mark M. Westerfield

    University of Washington, United States

    4 publications · 175 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. RL
    Rohit Lamba

    Pennsylvania State University, United States

    4 publications · 76 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. MB
    Marco Battaglini

    Princeton University, United States

    3 publications · 286 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 429

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 33 publications · 851 citations

    16

    h-index

  2. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 11 publications · 448 citations

    11

    h-index

  3. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 13 publications · 295 citations

    11

    h-index

  4. Review of Financial Studies

    10 publications · 1.3K citations

    10

    h-index

  5. Econometrica

    9 publications · 1.3K citations

    9

    h-index

1–5