Dynamic Moral Hazard
Dynamic Moral Hazard is a principal-agent problem in which incentives are distorted over time due to unobservable actions by a self-interested agent whose behavior affects future outcomes, risk, and information asymmetry in an intertemporal setting.
159
Publications
12.4K
Citations
260
Authors
193
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
26
Parents
159
Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning
Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege · Journal of Banking & Finance · 1998 · 749 citations · Full text
Steven Shavell · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1979 · 686 citations
Investment, Moral Hazard, and Occupational Licensing
Carl D. Shapiro · The Review of Economic Studies · 1986 · 336 citations
Large Risks, Limited Liability, and Dynamic Moral Hazard
Bruno Biais, Thomas Mariotti, Jean‐Charles Rochet et al. · Econometrica · 2010 · 319 citations · Full text
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193
Centre for Economic Policy Research
London, United Kingdom
9 h-index
11 publications
953 citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
7 h-index
9 publications
784 citations
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, United States
6 h-index
9 publications
444 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
6 h-index
8 publications
2.7K citations

University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, United States
5 h-index
6 publications
330 citations

National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
5 h-index
6 publications
353 citations
Duke University
Durham, United States
5 h-index
5 publications
213 citations
Princeton University
Princeton, United States
5 h-index
5 publications
738 citations
1–8 of 193
Repository · 16 publications · 325 citations
12
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Repository · 12 publications · 338 citations
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JET · 6 publications · 300 citations
6
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JPE · 4 publications · 576 citations
4
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4 publications · 562 citations
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