Dynamic Moral Hazard

Dynamic Moral Hazard is a principal-agent problem in which incentives are distorted over time due to unobservable actions by a self-interested agent whose behavior affects future outcomes, risk, and information asymmetry in an intertemporal setting.

159

Publications

12.4K

Citations

260

Authors

193

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

26

Authors

260

  1. JP
    Jean Pinquet

    Université Paris Nanterre, France

    4 publications · 285 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. JH
    Jaap H. Abbring

    Tilburg University, Netherlands

    4 publications · 328 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. TP
    Tomasz Piskorski

    Columbia University, United States

    4 publications · 251 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. ÁÁ
    Árpád Ábrahám

    European University Institute, Italy

    3 publications · 115 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. CS
    Christopher Sleet

    Carnegie Mellon University, United States

    3 publications · 33 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 260

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 16 publications · 325 citations

    12

    h-index

  2. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 12 publications · 338 citations

    11

    h-index

  3. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 6 publications · 300 citations

    6

    h-index

  4. Journal of Political Economy

    JPE · 4 publications · 576 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. The Review of Economic Studies

    4 publications · 562 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5