Econometrica · 1987 · 3K citations · 8 references
BusinessBusiness EconomicsEconomicsAgency TheoryIncentive SystemsMicroeconomicsIncentive CompensationIncentive SchemesMonetary IncentivesPrincipal-agent ProblemsPrincipal-agent TheoryRisk AversionAgency Theory In CompensationConstant Absolute Risk AversionConstant Absolute Risk Aversion UtilityIncentive ProvisionLinearityMultivariate Normal DistributionNonlinear Utility FunctionsPrincipal-agent Incentives
The linearity of optimal incentives arises partly because the agent’s rich strategy space allows exploitation of nonlinear accounting aggregates. The study examines how to design intertemporal incentives for a risk‑averse agent with constant absolute risk aversion. In a continuous‑time model, the agent controls the drift of accounts subject to small random shocks, and the problem reduces to a static mean‑control setting with a linear compensation rule, enabling tractable analysis under exponential utility and normal distributions. The optimal contract is a linear function of a fixed number of event‑count accounts, independent of time periods, and remains linear when the principal observes only aggregate measures such as revenue or profit.
We consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion. The optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of N accounts which count the number of times that each of the N kinds of observable events occurs. The number N is independent of the number of time periods, so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation. In a continuous time version of the problem, the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent, small random fluctuations. The solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule. If the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates, such as revenues, costs, or profits, the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates. The combination of exponential utility, normal distributions, and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do, as we illustrate. We interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent's strategy space, which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated, nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates.
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Moral Hazard and Observability
Bengt Holmström · The Bell Journal of Economics · 1979 · 8.5K citations
The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
William P. Rogerson · Econometrica · 1985 · 885 citations
Business, Economics, Mathematics +17