Journal of Accounting and Economics · 1999 · 187 citations · 10 references
BusinessBusiness EconomicsEconomicsContract TheoryIncentive SystemsMicroeconomicsConvex AnalysisIncentive CompatibilityIncentive SchemesInformation AsymmetryOptimal ContractingPrincipal-agent ProblemsCompensation Contract DesignContract Design Under Asymmetric InformationOptimal Contracting Theory
10
Continuous Univariate Distributions.
Yasuhiro Omori, Norman L. Johnson, S. Kotz et al. · Journal of the American Statistical Association · 1995 · 9.3K citations
Moral Hazard and Observability
Bengt Holmström · The Bell Journal of Economics · 1979 · 8.5K citations
Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
Ian Jewitt · Econometrica · 1988 · 531 citations