Computational Intelligence · 2002 · 99 citations · 35 references
BusinessBusiness EconomicsEconomicsAuction TheoryContractsGame TheoryAsymmetric AuctionsAuction DesignAuction FormatsAuction PricingCombinatorial AuctionsDynamic AuctionsAuction AlgorithmsAuction-based NegotiationCombinatorial ExchangeGame Theoretic ReasoningNash Equilibrium ProblemsOnline BiddingOnline Combinatorial AuctionsRational Agents
This paper presents eMediator , an electronic commerce server prototype that demonstrates ways in which algorithmic support and game–theoretic incentive engineering can jointly improve the efficiency of e–commerce. eAuctionHouse , the configurable auction server, includes a variety of generalized combinatorial auctions and exchanges, pricing schemes, bidding languages, mobile agents, and user support for choosing an auction type. We introduce two new logical bidding languages for combinatorial markets: the XOR bidding language and the OR–of–XORs bidding language. Unlike the traditional OR bidding language, these are fully expressive. They therefore enable the use of the Clarke–Groves pricing mechanism for motivating the bidders to bid truthfully. eAuctionHouse also supports supply/demand curve bidding. eCommitter , the leveled commitment contract optimizer, determines the optimal contract price and decommitting penalties for a variety of leveled commitment contracting mechanisms, taking into account that rational agents will decommit strategically in Nash equilibrium. It also determines the optimal decommitting strategies for any given leveled commitment contract. eExchangeHouse , the safe exchange planner, enables unenforced anonymous exchanges by dividing the exchange into chunks and sequencing those chunks to be delivered safely in alternation between the buyer and the seller.
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COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
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