Combinatorial Auctions

Combinatorial Auctions is a type of auction mechanism in which bidders can place bids on combinations of discrete, heterogeneous items, rather than individual items alone, allowing them to express complex preferences over bundles due to interdependencies in valuations.

1.5K

Publications

91.9K

Citations

2.4K

Authors

864

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

330

Authors

2.4K

  1. TS
    Tüomas Sandholm

    Carnegie Mellon University, United States

    45 publications · 4.2K citations

    32

    h-index

  2. DC
    David C. Parkes

    Harvard University Press, United States

    28 publications · 2.1K citations

    23

    h-index

  3. NN
    Noam Nisan

    Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    30 publications · 3.2K citations

    23

    h-index

  4. SD
    Shahar Dobzinski

    Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    29 publications · 1.5K citations

    20

    h-index

  5. TR
    Tim Roughgarden

    Stanford University, United States

    27 publications · 886 citations

    18

    h-index

1–5 of 2.4K

Venues

  1. Games and Economic Behavior

    29 publications · 2.7K citations

    22

    h-index

  2. Management Science

    21 publications · 3K citations

    20

    h-index

  3. European Journal of Operational Research

    27 publications · 1.2K citations

    18

    h-index

  4. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 21 publications · 1.8K citations

    17

    h-index

  5. arXiv (Cornell University)

    Repository · 30 publications · 711 citations

    16

    h-index

1–5