Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial Auctions is a type of auction mechanism in which bidders can place bids on combinations of discrete, heterogeneous items, rather than individual items alone, allowing them to express complex preferences over bundles due to interdependencies in valuations.
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864
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Publications per year
2017–2026
330
1.5K
Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading
Albert S. Kyle · Econometrica · 1985 · 10K citations
Business, Economics, Auction Theory +12
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
Sven de Vries, Rakesh Vohra · INFORMS journal on computing · 2003 · 997 citations
Business, Economics, Mathematics +16
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Tüomas Sandholm · Artificial Intelligence · 2002 · 925 citations
Business, Mathematics, Algorithms +13
Paul Klemperer · SSRN Electronic Journal · 2004 · 792 citations · Full text
Business, Economics, Auction Theory +14
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864
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
35 h-index
116 publications
10.1K citations
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Jerusalem, Israel
35 h-index
85 publications
8.7K citations
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, United States
34 h-index
84 publications
5.9K citations

Cornell University
Ithaca, United States
28 h-index
55 publications
3.3K citations
Microsoft (United States)
Redmond, United States
28 h-index
75 publications
4.5K citations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, United States
27 h-index
68 publications
5.6K citations

University of Hong Kong
Pok Fu Lam, Hong Kong
21 h-index
47 publications
2K citations
Google (United States)
Mountain View, United States
20 h-index
59 publications
3.8K citations
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29 publications · 2.7K citations
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21 publications · 3K citations
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27 publications · 1.2K citations
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JET · 21 publications · 1.8K citations
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Repository · 30 publications · 711 citations
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