Robust Combinatorial Auctions is a formal framework within mechanism design that ensures stable and efficient allocation of indivisible goods under bidder valuations with uncertainty or incomplete information, distinguished by its resilience to strategic manipulation and performance guarantees across diverse preference and information environments.
20
Publications
935
Citations
46
Authors
27
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
2
Parents
Publications
20
1–5 of 20
Authors
46
- MY
4
h-index
- YS
3
h-index
- SM
3
h-index
- BO
2
h-index
- AH
2
h-index
1–5 of 46
Institutions
27
NTT (Japan)
Tokyo, Japan
3 h-index
9 publications
507 citations
Fordham University
New York, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
85 citations
University College Cork
Cork, Ireland
2 h-index
4 publications
94 citations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, United States
2 h-index
4 publications
47 citations
University of Arizona
Tucson, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
85 citations
Nagoya Institute of Technology
Nagoya, Japan
1 h-index
2 publications
22 citations
Nanyang Technological University
Singapore, Singapore
1 h-index
1 publications
10 citations
University of Connecticut
Storrs, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
11 citations
1–8 of 27
Venues
- Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
JEMS · 2 publications · 221 citations
2
h-index
- Experimental Economics
2 publications · 85 citations
2
h-index
- Transportation Research Part B Methodological
1 publications · 53 citations
1
h-index
- Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Conference · 1 publications · 10 citations
1
h-index
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University)
Repository · 1 publications · 91 citations
1
h-index
1–5