Asymmetric Auctions

Asymmetric Auctions is an auction format in which bidders possess heterogeneous private information or valuation distributions, thereby distinguishing it from symmetric auctions where all bidders share identical informational characteristics.

853

Publications

57.9K

Citations

1.3K

Authors

631

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

114

Authors

1.3K

  1. MY
    Makoto Yokoo

    Kyushu University, Japan

    11 publications · 435 citations

    11

    h-index

  2. PM
    Paul Milgrom

    Stanford University, United States

    10 publications · 1.9K citations

    10

    h-index

  3. AS
    Aner Sela

    Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel

    10 publications · 368 citations

    10

    h-index

  4. DL
    Dan Levin

    The Ohio State University, United States

    9 publications · 436 citations

    9

    h-index

  5. PK
    Paul Klemperer

    University of Oxford, United Kingdom

    9 publications · 2K citations

    9

    h-index

1–5 of 1.3K

Venues

  1. Games and Economic Behavior

    45 publications · 2.7K citations

    28

    h-index

  2. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 36 publications · 3K citations

    26

    h-index

  3. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 64 publications · 1.5K citations

    21

    h-index

  4. Economics Letters

    26 publications · 1.2K citations

    17

    h-index

  5. American Economic Review

    17 publications · 1.7K citations

    16

    h-index

1–5