Interim Asymmetry

Interim Asymmetry is a theoretical construct in auction theory that characterizes asymmetric information environments among bidders at the interim stage, where each bidder knows their own private valuation but not others’, and the asymmetry arises from differential access to information or heterogeneous belief distributions, distinguishing it from symmetric or ex ante models.

20

Publications

1.2K

Citations

35

Authors

35

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

0

Authors

35

  1. JK
    Jinwoo Kim

    Yonsei University, South Korea

    2 publications · 154 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. IA
    Ittai Abraham

    Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    2 publications · 70 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. YC
    Yeon‐Koo Che

    Columbia University, United States

    2 publications · 154 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. SA
    Susan Athey

    Stanford University, United States

    2 publications · 70 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. MG
    Michael Grubb

    University of Cambridge, United Kingdom

    2 publications · 70 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 35

Venues

  1. Games and Economic Behavior

    5 publications · 387 citations

    5

    h-index

  2. Economic Theory

    2 publications · 22 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. Finance and Stochastics

    2 publications · 80 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. Econstor (Econstor)

    Repository · 1 publications · 26 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Economics Letters

    1 publications · 11 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5