"Locking-in" effects during a game of Chicken

Abstract

Such terms as brinkmanship, rationality of irrationality, and doctrine of the last clear have been much in vogue among intellectuals (e.g., Schelling, 1960) who are concerned with formulating a rationale to guide strategic choices in a situation of international conflict. The basic notion underlying these different terms is that a bargainer will gain an advantage if he can commit himself irrevocably so that the last clear chance of avoiding mutual disaster rests with his opponent. A child who works himself up to the point that he will have a temper tantrum if his parents refuse to let him sit where he wants in the restaurant is using this bargaining tactic. So is the driver who cuts in front of you on a highway as he appears to be deaf to the insistent blasts of your horn. And so is a nation that says to another nation that its honor as a nation and the sacrifices of its soldiers will not permit withdrawal or defeat. It is evident that this type of bargaining maneuver can sometimes be very effective. Yet, we wondered, would one expect this type of bargaining tactic to be effective when both sides could resort to it? We also wondered whether it is a ploy that is as suitable for a continuing relationship as it might be for a single, unrepeated encounter. To investigate these questions, we employed a modified ver-