Strategic Interaction is a fundamental concept in game-theoretic analysis within microeconomics, decision theory, experimental economics, and competitive strategy, denoting a situation in which the outcomes for each participant depend critically on the actions and strategic choices of others, necessitating interdependent decision-making under conditions of rationality and mutual foresight.
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Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
In‐Koo Cho, David M. Kreps · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1987 · 3.3K citations
H. Peyton Young · Econometrica · 1993 · 2.4K citations
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Stanford University
Stanford, United States
40 h-index
73 publications
12.6K citations
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
29 h-index
56 publications
5.7K citations
Harvard University
Cambridge, United States
28 h-index
63 publications
7.7K citations
New York University
New York, United States
27 h-index
57 publications
12.2K citations
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, United States
27 h-index
49 publications
6K citations
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Paris, France
25 h-index
60 publications
3K citations
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, United States
24 h-index
74 publications
12.4K citations
Yale University
New Haven, United States
24 h-index
54 publications
3.8K citations
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- Games and Economic Behavior
119 publications · 13.2K citations
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- Journal of Economic Theory
JET · 74 publications · 6.4K citations
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- Journal of Conflict Resolution
91 publications · 7.7K citations
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- Econometrica
62 publications · 21.5K citations
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- American Economic Review
46 publications · 9.6K citations
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