Strategic Substitutes

Strategic Substitutes is a game-theoretic concept in which the best response correspondence of a player exhibits strategic substitutability, meaning that an increase in one player’s strategy leads to a decrease in the marginal benefit of the other player’s strategy, resulting in downward-sloping reaction functions in strategic interaction.

171

Publications

12.2K

Citations

313

Authors

228

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

36

Authors

313

  1. DA
    Daron Acemoğlu

    Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States

    4 publications · 255 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. TS
    Tarun Sabarwal

    University of Kansas, United States

    4 publications · 130 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. EF
    Ernst Fehr

    University of Zurich, Switzerland

    4 publications · 224 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. JT
    Jean‐Robert Tyran

    University of Copenhagen, Denmark

    4 publications · 224 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. AM
    Azarakhsh Malekian

    University of Toronto, Canada

    3 publications · 223 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 313

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 20 publications · 662 citations

    17

    h-index

  2. American Economic Review

    7 publications · 605 citations

    7

    h-index

  3. Management Science

    5 publications · 481 citations

    5

    h-index

  4. Games and Economic Behavior

    4 publications · 284 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 4 publications · 132 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5