Strategic Bargaining
Strategic Bargaining is a theoretical framework within bargaining experiments that models negotiation as a sequential decision-making process in which rational agents employ calculated offers and counteroffers to maximize their payoffs, accounting for the strategic interdependence of actions and the potential use of delay, commitment, or information manipulation to influence outcomes.
381
Publications
33K
Citations
611
Authors
354
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
25
Parents
381
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Ariel Rubinstein · Econometrica · 1982 · 5.4K citations
Rationalist explanations for war
James D. Fearon · International Organization · 1995 · 4K citations
Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
Ariel Rubinstein, Asher Wolinsky · Econometrica · 1985 · 529 citations
Strategic Choice in Negotiation
Dean G. Pruitt · American Behavioral Scientist · 1983 · 435 citations
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354
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
14 h-index
23 publications
2.4K citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
12 h-index
17 publications
536 citations
University of Chicago
Chicago, United States
9 h-index
10 publications
4.8K citations

University of Warwick
Coventry, United Kingdom
8 h-index
13 publications
510 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
7 h-index
10 publications
738 citations
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Urbana, United States
7 h-index
10 publications
785 citations

National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
7 h-index
14 publications
863 citations

The University of Melbourne
Melbourne, Australia
7 h-index
12 publications
779 citations
1–8 of 354
12 publications · 1.3K citations
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12 publications · 1.1K citations
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Repository · 13 publications · 555 citations
11
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9 publications · 6.6K citations
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9 publications · 804 citations
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