The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2009 · 70 citations · 37 references
BusinessBusiness EconomicsEconomicsAuction TheoryCollective BargainingContract TheoryAuction DesignAuction EfficiencyAuction PricingCollusion In AuctionsDynamic AuctionsProcurement AuctionsAuction Design Against CollusionCollusion In Common-value AuctionsCollusion-resistant MechanismsCollusive Bidding Analysis
Previous work has addressed the relative vulnerability of different auction schemes to collusive bidding. The common wisdom is that ascending-bid and second-price auctions are highly susceptible to collusion. We show that the details of ascending-bid and second-price auctions, including bidder registration procedures and procedures for information revelation during the auction, can be designed to completely inhibit, or unintentionally facilitate, certain types of collusion. If auctions are designed without acknowledging the possibility of collusion then the design will ignore key features that impact the potential success of colluding bidders.
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COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
William Vickrey · The Journal of Finance · 1961 · 7.3K citations
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Paul Milgrom, Robert J. Weber · Econometrica · 1982 · 3.8K citations
R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan · Scholarship@Western (Western University) · 1986 · 1.9K citations · Full text
Auctions and Bidding: A Primer
Paul Milgrom · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · 1989 · 863 citations · Full text
Business, Economics, Auction Theory +15
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Eric Maskin · Econometrica · 1994 · 815 citations · Full text