Journal of Accounting and Economics · 1998 · 221 citations · 43 references
ManagementAccountancyAccountingAgency TheoryCorporate FinanceExecutive CompensationAgency Theory In AccountingCash Incentive CompensationCompensation StrategyEarnings ManagementEquity CompensationIncentive CompensationCompensation Performance SensitivityCross-sectional Financial AnalysisExecutive Compensation AnalysisExecutive Compensation Effects
A cross-sectional analysis of cash compensation paid to CEOs of 713 US firms reveals that the sensitivity of compensation to earnings varies directly with earnings persistence. Additional analysis indicates that this sensitivity is greater for cases where executives are approaching retirement. Such evidence suggests the use of earnings persistence to counterbalance adverse consequences of earnings-based contracting with managers who face finite decision horizons.
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The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities
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Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds
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