Executive Compensation Effects is a theoretical construct in financial economics that identifies the causal influence of executive pay structures on corporate stock purchase behaviors, distinguishing itself from other governance mechanisms by specifically linking incentivization design to managerial decision-making in capital allocation.
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186K
Citations
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Authors
1.2K
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
519
Parents
Publications
2K
CEO incentives and earnings management
Daniel Bergstresser · 2004 · 2.3K citations
Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation
Jay C. Hartzell, Laura T. Starks · The Journal of Finance · 2003 · 2.1K citations · Full text
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- MJ
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- LR
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- DF
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- DY
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- LH
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Institutions
1.2K
National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
47 h-index
105 publications
30.4K citations
European Corporate Governance Institute
Brussels, Belgium
37 h-index
99 publications
8.2K citations
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
31 h-index
61 publications
22.9K citations
New York University
New York, United States
27 h-index
63 publications
11.8K citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
25 h-index
43 publications
6.6K citations
Pennsylvania State University
State College, United States
25 h-index
39 publications
5.7K citations
Arizona State University
Tempe, United States
24 h-index
36 publications
5.3K citations
Centre for Economic Policy Research
London, United Kingdom
22 h-index
43 publications
2.3K citations
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- SSRN Electronic Journal
Repository · 361 publications · 18.5K citations
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- Strategic Management Journal
SMJ · 39 publications · 8.8K citations
37
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- Academy of Management Journal
AMJ · 43 publications · 9.5K citations
36
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- Journal of Financial Economics
38 publications · 15.9K citations
34
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- Journal of Corporate Finance
51 publications · 5.3K citations
33
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