Concepedia

Executive Compensation Manipulation

Executive Compensation Manipulation is a form of managerial opportunism in which corporate executives exploit their informational and positional advantages to alter the structure, timing, or reporting of their compensation in ways that increase personal gains without corresponding improvements in firm performance.

31

Publications

4.8K

Citations

54

Authors

51

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

7

Parents

Publications

31

CEO incentives and earnings management

Daniel Bergstresser · 2004 · 2.3K citations

, , +17

CEO incentives and earnings management

Daniel Bergstresser, Thomas Philippon · Journal of Financial Economics · 2005 · 284 citations · Full text

, , +17

Executive pay and shareholder litigation

Lin Peng, Ailsa Röell · European Finance Review · 2007 · 280 citations · Full text

, , +17

Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities

Chris Armstrong, Alan D. Jagolinzer, David F. Larcker · Journal of Accounting Research · 2009 · 275 citations

, , +16

Ceos On the Edge: Earnings Manipulation and Stock-Based Incentive Misalignment

Xiaomeng Zhang, Kathryn M. Bartol, Ken G. Smith et al. · Academy of Management Journal · 2008 · 262 citations

, , +17

1–5 of 31

Authors

54

  1. LP
    Lin Peng

    Baruch College, United States

    5 publications · 449 citations

    5

    h-index

  2. AR
    Ailsa Röell

    Columbia University, United States

    5 publications · 647 citations

    5

    h-index

  3. GM
    Grant McQueen

    Brigham Young University, United States

    2 publications · 32 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. DF
    David F. Larcker

    Stanford University, United States

    2 publications · 332 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. RJ
    Robert J. Schonlau

    Colorado State University, United States

    2 publications · 32 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 54

Institutions

51

  1. Baruch College

    New York, United States

    5 h-index

    6 publications

    688 citations

  2. Columbia University

    New York, United States

    4 h-index

    5 publications

    720 citations

  3. European Corporate Governance Institute

    Brussels, Belgium

    4 h-index

    4 publications

    201 citations

  4. New York University

    New York, United States

    2 h-index

    2 publications

    463 citations

  5. Imperial College London

    London, United Kingdom

    2 h-index

    2 publications

    78 citations

  6. Office of International Affairs

    Washington, United States

    2 h-index

    2 publications

    446 citations

  7. City University of New York

    New York, United States

    2 h-index

    2 publications

    302 citations

  8. Kellogg's (Canada)

    Mississauga, Canada

    1 h-index

    1 publications

    13 citations

1–8 of 51

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 11 publications · 403 citations

    11

    h-index

  2. The Journal of Finance

    2 publications · 248 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

    2 publications · 57 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. Journal of Accounting Research

    JAR · 2 publications · 298 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. Journal of Financial Economics

    1 publications · 284 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5