Effort Incentive Compatibility is a constraint in principal-agent models within contract theory that requires the agent’s optimal action choice under the proposed contract to align with the effort level that maximizes the principal’s expected utility.
14
Publications
940
Citations
28
Authors
17
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
3
Parents
Publications
14
Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
Ian Jewitt · Econometrica · 1988 · 531 citations
Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
Joel Sobel · International Economic Review · 1993 · 84 citations
Democracy, Autocracy and Bureaucracy
Avinash Dixit · Journal of Globalization and Development · 2010 · 54 citations
Rom Y. Schrift, Oded Netzer, Ran Kivetz · Journal of Marketing Research · 2011 · 46 citations
1–5 of 14
Authors
28
- RY
1
h-index
- AD
1
h-index
- XY
1
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- ST
1
h-index
- JS
1
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1–5 of 28
Institutions
17
Washington University in St. Louis
St Louis, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
97 citations
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
107 citations
Soochow University
Taipei, Taiwan
1 h-index
1 publications
11 citations
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
16 citations
Wuhan University of Science and Technology
Wuhan, China
1 h-index
2 publications
34 citations
Fudan University
Shanghai, China
1 h-index
1 publications
16 citations
Princeton University
Princeton, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
54 citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
1 h-index
2 publications
92 citations
1–8 of 17
Venues
- Engineering Construction & Architectural Management
1 publications · 17 citations
1
h-index
- Journal of Economic Theory
JET · 1 publications · 61 citations
1
h-index
- Service Industries Journal
1 publications · 11 citations
1
h-index
- International Economic Review
1 publications · 84 citations
1
h-index
- Journal of Globalization and Development
1 publications · 54 citations
1
h-index
1–5