Commitment In Bargaining

Commitment in Bargaining is a strategic mechanism in negotiation theory whereby a party credibly restricts its own future actions or payoffs to influence the expectations and behavior of others, thereby altering the bargaining equilibrium in its favor.

44

Publications

3.2K

Citations

77

Authors

56

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

5

Authors

77

  1. TM
    Topi Miettinen

    Hanken School of Economics, Finland

    2 publications · 77 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. TE
    Tore Ellingsen

    Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden

    2 publications · 77 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. AM
    Abhinay Muthoo

    University of Essex, United Kingdom

    2 publications · 129 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. MA
    Margaret A. Neale

    Stanford University, United States

    1 publications · 26 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. KE
    Karen E. Albert

    University of Rochester, United States

    1 publications · 22 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 77

Venues

  1. Games and Economic Behavior

    4 publications · 141 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. The Journal of Law Economics and Organization

    LEO · 2 publications · 104 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. Econometrica

    2 publications · 66 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 2 publications · 221 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. Review of Economic Dynamics

    2 publications · 33 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5