Agent Effort Provision

Agent Effort Provision is a theoretical construct in performance-based compensation that denotes the degree and quality of discretionary input exerted by an agent in fulfilling tasks, distinguished by its endogeneity to incentive design and its role in determining contract efficiency.

87

Publications

8.2K

Citations

156

Authors

122

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

13

Authors

156

  1. GG
    George Georgiadis

    Northwestern University, United States

    5 publications · 160 citations

    5

    h-index

  2. SA
    Susan Athey

    Stanford University, United States

    3 publications · 275 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. MH
    Margaret H. Christ

    University of Georgia, United States

    2 publications · 220 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. JH
    Johannes Hörner

    Yale University, United States

    2 publications · 129 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. DR
    Dmitry Ryvkin

    Florida State University, United States

    2 publications · 88 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 156

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 15 publications · 547 citations

    11

    h-index

  2. The RAND Journal of Economics

    9 publications · 474 citations

    9

    h-index

  3. Management Science

    7 publications · 1.4K citations

    7

    h-index

  4. Journal of Labor Economics

    JOLE · 5 publications · 703 citations

    5

    h-index

  5. Journal of Management Accounting Research

    JMAR · 5 publications · 181 citations

    5

    h-index

1–5