Agent Effort Provision
Agent Effort Provision is a theoretical construct in performance-based compensation that denotes the degree and quality of discretionary input exerted by an agent in fulfilling tasks, distinguished by its endogeneity to incentive design and its role in determining contract efficiency.
87
Publications
8.2K
Citations
156
Authors
122
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
13
87
Innovation Contests, Open Innovation, and Multiagent Problem Solving
Christian Terwiesch, Yi Xu · Management Science · 2008 · 928 citations · Full text
The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
Jean‐Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole · Econometrica · 1988 · 691 citations
Salesforce Compensation Plans: An Agency Theoretic Perspective
Amiya K. Basu, Rajiv Lal, V. Srinivasan et al. · Marketing Science · 1985 · 601 citations
Roman Inderst, Marco Ottaviani · American Economic Review · 2009 · 393 citations
1–5 of 87
156
5
h-index
3
h-index
2
h-index
2
h-index
2
h-index
1–5 of 156
122
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
5 h-index
7 publications
1.5K citations

University of Cologne
Cologne, Germany
5 h-index
5 publications
277 citations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
207 citations
Duke University
Durham, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
696 citations
Emory University
Atlanta, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
285 citations
University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, United States
3 h-index
4 publications
73 citations
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
169 citations
Florida State University
Tallahassee, United States
3 h-index
4 publications
142 citations
1–8 of 122
Repository · 15 publications · 547 citations
11
h-index
9 publications · 474 citations
9
h-index
7 publications · 1.4K citations
7
h-index
JOLE · 5 publications · 703 citations
5
h-index
JMAR · 5 publications · 181 citations
5
h-index
1–5