Mathematics of Operations Research · 2022 · 31 citations · 18 references
Social SciencesComputer ScienceEconomicsDistributed SystemsGame TheoryMicroeconomicsDistributed CoordinationInformation AsymmetryInformation EconomicsMechanism DesignResource SharingSharing EconomyDynamicsEquilibrium Analysis On NetworksMarket Equilibrium AnalysisMulti-agent Resource AllocationNetwork EquilibriumNetwork Resource SharingPrivate Information RevelationResource Allocation On Networks
We consider a sharing economy over a network in which each vertex agent allocates resources to its neighbors in response to their contributions. General equilibrium theory can be applied here to solve the problem of deciding how to fairly and efficiently allocate resources among agents as resource sharing over the network can be modeled as a pure exchange economy. It is known that proportional sharing dynamics converges to a market equilibrium solution. We are particularly interested in proportional sharing dynamics as a mechanism for network resource sharing. Our focus is on the key issue in internet market design: whether an agent may manipulate its report of its own private information to gain more resources under this mechanism. This work establishes the first mathematical proof that such a practical distributed network resource-sharing protocol is truthful against the manipulative strategies of feasible weight misreporting and edge deletion applied both individually and together. Funding: This work was supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China [Grants 11871366, 62172012]; Beijing Outstanding Young Scientist Program [Grant BJJWZYJH012019100020098]; the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities; the Research Funds of Renmin University of China [Grant 297522503709]; and the Intelligent Social Governance Platform, Major Innovation & Planning Interdisciplinary Platform for the “Double-First Class” Initiative, Renmin University of China.
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