Review of Financial Studies · 2021 · 32 citations · 21 references
ManagementCorporate GovernanceEconomicsAgency TheoryContract TheoryPublic EconomicsCompensation ReformInvestment IncentivesInvestment PolicyPension AdministrationPension Fund GovernancePension FundsAgency Cost EffectsExcess ProfitsExcessive CompensationPay-to-play RulesPay-to-play SchemesPortfolio Choice TheoryPublic Investment RisksRisk Outrage
Abstract Public pension boards fear inciting stakeholder outrage if they compensate internal investment managers with market-level salaries. We derive theoretical implications in an agency-portfolio-choice model motivated by inequality aversion. In a global sample, relaxing the effect of outrage on contracting leads to an average annual incremental value-added of $49 million generated through 11 bps in higher excess returns from risky assets, at the cost of $302,429 in additional compensation. Governance reforms that address outrage by reducing political appointees or requiring independent skills-based boards can increase the annual value-added. These findings are orthogonal to costly political distortions from underfunding and pay-to-play schemes. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
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A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Ernst Fehr, Klaus M. Schmidt · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1999 · 11.1K citations · Full text
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Gary E. Bolton, Axel Ockenfels · American Economic Review · 2000 · 5.5K citations
William F. Sharpe · The Journal of Portfolio Management · 1992 · 1.6K citations