International Economic Review · 2021 · 21 citations · 15 references
BusinessDecision SciencesEconomicsAgency TheoryPersuasionStrategic Decision-makingAsymmetric InformationChoice Under UncertaintyDecision-making Under UncertaintyPrincipal-agent TheoryRisk PreferencesStrategic InteractionDecision Analysis Under UncertaintyMulti-agent Decision MakingPreference Under UncertaintyRisk DominanceStrategic Decision-making Under UncertaintyStrategic Information RevelationStrategic UncertaintyUncertainty Under Strategic Interaction
Abstract A principal wishes to persuade multiple agents to take a particular action profile. Each agent cares about both a payoff‐relevant state and other agents' actions. The principal discloses information about the state to control the agents' behavior by using their strategic uncertainty. We show that for any nondegenerate prior, the principal can persuade the agents to take an action profile as a unique rationalizable outcome if that action profile satisfies a generalization of risk dominance. Moreover, this result remains true even if each of the agents is allowed to strategically choose whether to receive information from the principal or not.
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