RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2016 · 114 citations · 33 references
Open access
Social SciencesBehavioral SciencesEconomicsExperimental DesignExperimental EconomicsMicroeconomicsBehavioral IncentivesIncentive CompatibilityIncentive SchemesMechanism DesignMonetary IncentivesParticipant CompensationBehavioral Responses To Monetary IncentivesExperimental Evaluation Of IncentivesIncentive Compatible MechanismsLaboratory Incentive ExperimentsRandom ExperimentsRandomized ExperimentsTheoretical Framework AlignmentTreatment Allocation
Experimental economists currently lack a convention for how to pay subjects in experiments with multiple tasks. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing this question. Assuming monotonicity (dominated gambles are never chosen) and nothing else, we prove that paying for one randomly-chosen problem — the random problem selection (RPS) mechanism — is essentially the only incentive compatible mechanism. Paying for every period is similarly justified when we assume only a ‘no complementarities at the top’ (NCaT) condition. To help experimenters decide which is appropriate for their particular experiment, we also discuss empirical tests of these two assumptions.
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