Algorithmic Mechanism Design

Algorithmic Mechanism Design is a subfield of algorithmic game theory that integrates computational complexity and economic incentives by designing algorithms that produce truthful equilibria in strategic settings where participants act rationally to maximize their own utilities.

179

Publications

12.6K

Citations

341

Authors

187

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

48

Authors

341

  1. VC
    Vincent Conitzer

    Duke University, United States

    12 publications · 728 citations

    11

    h-index

  2. SD
    Shaddin Dughmi

    University of Southern California, United States

    10 publications · 366 citations

    10

    h-index

  3. TS
    Tüomas Sandholm

    Carnegie Mellon University, United States

    10 publications · 797 citations

    10

    h-index

  4. TR
    Tim Roughgarden

    Stanford University, United States

    8 publications · 531 citations

    8

    h-index

  5. DC
    David C. Parkes

    Harvard University Press, United States

    7 publications · 467 citations

    7

    h-index

1–5 of 341

Venues

  1. arXiv (Cornell University)

    Repository · 9 publications · 391 citations

    9

    h-index

  2. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

    Conference · 7 publications · 235 citations

    7

    h-index

  3. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 6 publications · 135 citations

    6

    h-index

  4. American Economic Review

    4 publications · 202 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. Communications of the ACM

    4 publications · 357 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5