Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations

Abstract

Groves mechanisms 288 10.4.2The VCG mechanism 292 10.4.3 VCG and individual rationality 295 10.4.4 VCG and weak budget balance 296 10.4.5 Drawbacks of VCG 297 10.4.6 Budget balance and efficiency 301 10.4.7 The AGV mechanism 302 10.5 Beyond efficiency 303 10.5.1 What else can be implemented in dominant strategies?303 10.5.2 Tractable Groves mechanisms 305 10.6 Computational applications of mechanism design 307 10.6.1 Task scheduling 307 10.6.2Bandwidth allocation in computer networks 309 10.6.3Multicast cost sharing 312 10.