Groves Mechanisms

Groves Mechanisms is a formal mechanism design framework within dominant strategy theory that belongs to the class of direct revelation mechanisms and is distinguished by its use of monetary transfers aligned with the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) principle to ensure truthful reporting of preferences while achieving allocative efficiency.

30

Publications

2.8K

Citations

56

Authors

35

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

1

Variants

Groves Mechanism

Authors

56

  1. JM
    Joseph M. Ostroy

    University of California, Los Angeles, United States

    2 publications · 74 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. PJ
    Philippe Jéhiel

    University College London, United Kingdom

    2 publications · 78 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. MP
    Motty Perry

    Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    2 publications · 223 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. LM
    Louis Makowski

    University of California, Davis, United States

    2 publications · 74 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. VK
    Vijay Krishna

    Pennsylvania State University, United States

    2 publications · 223 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 56

Venues

  1. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 4 publications · 191 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 2 publications · 98 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. European Accounting Review

    EAR · 2 publications · 37 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. 2

    h-index

  5. Contemporary Accounting Research

    CAR · 2 publications · 71 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5