Groves Mechanisms
Groves Mechanisms is a formal mechanism design framework within dominant strategy theory that belongs to the class of direct revelation mechanisms and is distinguished by its use of monetary transfers aligned with the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) principle to ensure truthful reporting of preferences while achieving allocative efficiency.
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2.8K
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56
Authors
35
Institutions
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2017–2026
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Variants
Groves Mechanism
Parents
30
Vijay Krishna, Motty Perry · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 1997 · 117 citations
Vijay Krishna, Motty Perry · SSRN Electronic Journal · 1997 · 106 citations · Full text
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École nationale des ponts et chaussées
Champs-sur-Marne, France
2 h-index
2 publications
78 citations
University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
74 citations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
49 citations
University of California, Davis
Davis, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
74 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
1.8K citations
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
1 h-index
2 publications
52 citations
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Beersheba, Israel
1 h-index
2 publications
50 citations

University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
45 citations
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Repository · 4 publications · 191 citations
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JET · 2 publications · 98 citations
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EAR · 2 publications · 37 citations
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Repository · 2 publications · 133 citations
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CAR · 2 publications · 71 citations
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