Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining

Abstract

We conduct experiments to investigate the effects of different majority requirements on bargaining outcomes in small and large groups. In particular, we use a Baron-Ferejohn protocol and investigate the effects
\nof decision rules on delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach
\nagreement) and measures of "fairness" (inclusiveness of coalitions, equality
\nof the distribution within a coalition). We find that larger groups and unanimity rule are associated with significantly larger decision making costs in the sense that first round proposals more often fail, leading to more costly delay. The higher rate of failure under unanimity rule and in large groups is a combination of three facts: (1) in these conditions, a larger number of individuals must agree, (2) an important fraction of individuals reject
\noffers below the equal share, and (3) proposers demand more (relative to the equal share) in large groups.