1c:I[419806,["/_next/static/chunks/bb923814e1f4d2e9.js","/_next/static/chunks/dd3ee9f5b7716ca6.js","/_next/static/chunks/4204a0ae82542ca8.js","/_next/static/chunks/30036bedc5269936.js","/_next/static/chunks/6e1aa89a642f40be.js","/_next/static/chunks/cd5e572bc3e4eb92.js","/_next/static/chunks/8ffd0b71567920d8.js","/_next/static/chunks/67ea6dfd21f16c5f.js","/_next/static/chunks/24eb4379f68013fd.js","/_next/static/chunks/b8cd775ffdf935bd.js","/_next/static/chunks/983103cd9eb7b428.js","/_next/static/chunks/d4ac9dcf27f6ff52.js","/_next/static/chunks/294b9525248c8e5f.js"],"default"] 1d:T49b,This note is concerned with the stability analysis of discrete-time systems with time-varying state delay. By defining new Lyapunov functions and by making use of novel techniques to achieve delay dependence, several new conditions are obtained for the asymptotic stability of these systems. The merit of the proposed conditions lies in their less conservativeness, which is achieved by circumventing the utilization of some bounding inequalities for cross products between two vectors and by paying careful attention to the subtle difference between the terms Sigma _m=k-dk ^k-1 (middot) and Sigma _m=k-dM ^k-1 (middot), which is largely ignored in the existing literature. These conditions are shown, via several examples, to be much less conservative than some existing result1e:T4b1,Accurate state estimation is of paramount importance to maintain normal operations of smart power grids. However, recent research shows that carefully produced attacks with the knowledge of the grid topology, i.e., Jacobian matrix, can bypass the bad data detection (BDD) system. The BDD is used to ensure the integrity of state estimation to filter faulty measurements introduced by device malfunctions or malicious attacks. However, to construct the false data injection attack vectors, a common assumption in most prior works on false data injection attacks is that the attacker has complete knowledge about the power grid topology and transmission-line admittances. By contrast, this paper studies the general problem of blind false data injection attacks using the principal component analysis approximation method without the knowledge of Jacobian matrix and the assumption regarding the distribution of state variables. The proposed attack is proven to be approximately stealthy. ¹ The performance of the proposed attack is analyzed. Simulations confirm the performance of the proposed method.1f:T4f6,Security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) against cyber attacks is an important yet challenging problem. Since most cyber attacks happen in erratic ways, it is difficult to describe them systematically. In this paper, instead of identifying a specific cyber attack model, we are focused on analyzing the system's response during cyber attacks. Deception attacks (or false data injection attacks), which are performed by tampering with system components or data, are not of particular concern if they can be easily detected by the system's monitoring system. However, intelligent cyber attackers can avoid being detected by the monitoring system by carefully design cyber attacks. Our main objective is to investigate the performance of such stealthy deception attacks from the system's perspective. We investigate three kinds of stealthy deception attacks according to the attacker's ability to compromise the system. Based on the information about the dynamics of the system and existing hypothesis testing algorithms, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the attacker could perform

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