Input-to-State Stabilizing Control Under Denial-of-Service

TLDR

The issue of cyber‑security has become ever more prevalent in the analysis and design of networked systems. The paper analyzes networked control systems under denial‑of‑service attacks and characterizes the attack frequency and duration that still allow input‑to‑state stability. ISS is achieved by scheduling transmission times appropriately, and examples illustrate the approach. The framework permits designers to trade performance against communication resources by selecting among multiple implementation options.

Abstract

The issue of cyber-security has become ever more prevalent in the analysis and design of networked systems. In this paper, we analyze networked control systems in the presence of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, namely attacks that prevent transmissions over the network. We characterize frequency and duration of the DoS attacks under which input-to-state stability (ISS) of the closed-loop system can be preserved. To achieve ISS, a suitable scheduling of the transmission times is determined. It is shown that the considered framework is flexible enough so as to allow the designer to choose from several implementation options that can be used for trading-off performance versus communication resources. Examples are given to substantiate the analysis.