The Economic Journal · 2009 · 63 citations · 34 references
ManagementCorporate GovernanceCorporate FinanceCorporate StrategySurvival AnalysisBoard IndependenceDuration AnalysisEmployee Turnover AnalysisExecutive SuccessionExit StrategiesTurnover AnalyticsCeo TurnoverChief Executive Officer Dismissal DecisionsExit Risk AnalysisManagement TurnoverManagerial TurnoverSurvival Analysis Of FirmsSurvival Analysis Of TurnoverTurnover Risk Analysis
We apply duration analysis to model the tenure and mode of exit of CEOs from FTSE 350 companies from 1996–2005, a decade in which corporate governance reforms have sought to increase the accountability of the CEO to shareholders and their representatives on the board. We find a greater likelihood of dismissal in the latter part of the period. However, we also find that the likelihood of forced departure sharply decreases from the fifth year of a CEO’s tenure. We find evidence that this is because CEOs who survive beyond year four are able to entrench themselves in their position.
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Separation of Ownership and Control
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