arXiv (Cornell University) · 2011 · 34 citations · 8 references
ManagementEconomicsGame TheoryIncentive SystemsMachine LearningIncentive CompatibilityIncentive SchemesIndividual IncentivesMonetary IncentivesReinforcement LearningCrowdsourced ParticipationCrowdsourcingCrowdsourcing Decision-makingIncentive MechanismsIncentive ProvisionPredictionPrediction Markets
Machine Learning competitions such as the Netflix Prize have proven reasonably successful as a method of "crowdsourcing" prediction tasks. But these competitions have a number of weaknesses, particularly in the incentive structure they create for the participants. We propose a new approach, called a Crowdsourced Learning Mechanism, in which participants collaboratively "learn" a hypothesis for a given prediction task. The approach draws heavily from the concept of a prediction market, where traders bet on the likelihood of a future event. In our framework, the mechanism continues to publish the current hypothesis, and participants can modify this hypothesis by wagering on an update. The critical incentive property is that a participant will profit an amount that scales according to how much her update improves performance on a released test set.
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Combinatorial Information Market Design
Robin Hanson · Information Systems Frontiers · 2003 · 492 citations
A Utility Framework for Bounded-Loss Market Makers
Yiling Chen, David M. Pennock · arXiv (Cornell University) · 2012 · 136 citations · Full text