2006 · 38 citations · 7 references
BusinessEconomicsInformation SystemsAuction TheoryE-commerce SystemsRevenue ManagementAuction DesignAuction PricingDynamic AuctionsAuction Price CompetitionAuction Pricing Under CompetitionOnline AuctionsRepeated Auction GamesRevenue IncreasesService ProviderService Provider Management
Many e-services are time-sensitive as the users request them for a specific time period. Such services need to be repeatedly offered to keep them constantly utilized. This paper studies winner selection strategies in a recurring auction for such time-sensitive e-services. We observe that because of uneven wealth distribution, the least wealthy bidders tend to drop out of recurring auction as they persistently loose. The bidders dropping out of an auction decrease competition and can cause a collapse of winning prices. We propose and evaluate a novel auction mechanism that enables bidder drop control. Compared to traditional auction mechanisms, ours increases revenue of the e-service provider and decreases loss of fairness of the e-service allocation.
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COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
William Vickrey · The Journal of Finance · 1961 · 7.3K citations
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William Vickrey · The Journal of Finance · 1961 · 1.9K citations
R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan · Scholarship@Western (Western University) · 1986 · 1.9K citations · Full text
Competitive generalized auctions
Amos Fiat, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline et al. · 2002 · 157 citations