Journal of Sports Economics · 2000 · 86 citations · 17 references
ManagementEconomicsHuman PerformanceIncentive SystemsReward SystemsAthletic PerformanceIndividual IncentivesMonetary IncentivesPerformance-based PayPerformance-based RewardsTournament IncentivesPrize IncentivesPrize-based IncentivesRunnersTournament Incentives In SportsTournament RankingTournament SortingTournaments TheoryWinner-take-all Incentives
This article explicitly compares the incentive and sorting theories of tournament performance in road races. Regressions omitting controls for runner ability suggest that runners record faster times the greater the loss they would suffer from finishing below their prerace ranking. However, the relationship between prize money at risk and finishing time weakens or vanishes with these controls. These results strongly suggest that races with large prizes record faster times because they attract faster runners, not because they encourage all runners to run faster.
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Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Edward P. Lazear, Sherwin Rosen · Journal of Political Economy · 1981 · 4.6K citations · Full text
Pay Equality and Industrial Politics
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