Journal of Labor Economics · 2010 · 49 citations · 33 references
ManagementAnimal SciencesEconomicsBehavioral EconomicsGame TheoryIncentive SystemsBehavioral IncentivesIncentive CompatibilityIndividual IncentivesMonetary IncentivesPerformance-based PayTournament IncentivesEffort Provision In TournamentsIncentive Effects On PerformancePay-for-performance StructuresPrize StructureTournament Incentives In SportsTournaments TheoryWinner-take-all Incentives
There is ample evidence that incentive‐pay structures, such as tournaments, result in increased performance. Is this due to selection or increased individual effort, and is any increased individual effort caused by pecuniary incentives or merely thirst for the thrill of victory (TOV)? Prior literature has not separated the different effects. We look at performance in horse and dog racing and find that only horses, controlled by jockeys during the race, exhibit performance corresponding to pecuniary incentives, while both respond to selection and TOV. The results show that pay structures do matter.
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