European Financial Management · 2006 · 53 citations · 50 references
ManagementBusiness AdministrationCorporate GovernanceAgency TheoryExecutive CompensationMergersDeferred CompensationEquity CompensationIncentive CompensationPerformance-based CompensationAgency Cost TheoryCompensation Decisions By BoardsCompletion BonusesExecutive Compensation AnalysisExecutive Compensation DecisionsExecutive Compensation EffectsExecutive Pay IncentivesManagerial Power Theory
Abstract This paper investigates the impact of M&As on bidder (CEO and other) executive compensation employing a unique sample of 100 completed bids in the UK over the 1998–2001 period. Our findings indicate that less independent and larger boards award CEOs significantly higher bonuses and salary following M&A completion both for the full sample and for the UK and US sub‐samples. UK CEOs and executives are rewarded more for the effort exerted in accomplishing intra ‐ industry or large mergers than for diversifying or small mergers and their cash pay is unaffected by other measures of their managerial skill or performance. US bidders are rewarded at higher levels than their UK counterparts and their remuneration is related only to measures of CEO dominance over the board of directors. Overall our findings offer support for the managerial power rather than the agency theory perspective on managerial compensation.
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Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Michael C. Jensen · American Economic Review · 1986 · 17.6K citations
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Michael S. Weisbach · Journal of Financial Economics · 1988 · 4.4K citations
Management, Corporate Governance, Organizational Behavior +12