International Economic Review · 1991 · 274 citations · 0 references
Social SciencesEconomicsContract TheoryDelegationGame TheoryBargaining TheoryCooperative Game TheoryCoordination GamesInformation AsymmetryNash EquilibriumNoncooperative Game TheoryContract Design Under Asymmetric InformationContracting With Private InformationContracts Made By AgentsNon-cooperative GamesNoncooperative BargainingNoncooperative GamesPareto Optimal SolutionSubgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
The role of commitments in noncooperative games is well acknowledged and documented. One way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game. In this paper, the authors study a delegation game in which the players can use agents strategically to play on their behalf and the contracts they sign with them are common knowledge. They show that, in such cases, every Pareto optimal outcome of the game can become the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the delegation game. The authors demonstrate this result by discussing the Cournot-type duopolistic game. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.